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Abstract
In the German parliament, the Bundestag, floor time is a scarce resource and is allocated to MPs by leaders of their re-
spective parliamentary party groups. Previous research indicates that highly salient plenary debates tend to be dominated
by party leaders and other loyal frontbenchers. Plenary speeches can therefore offer only limited insights into party unity.
Any MP can give a so-called ‘explanation of vote’ (EoVs) to justify their voting decision and/or express their point of view.
These written statements provide a more accurate depiction of the range of viewpoints present within legislative parties.
In order to assess the effect of party control on observed party unity and parliamentary contestation, discourse network
analysis has been employed in this study to compare legislative speech with EoVs in debates on the Greek crisis between
2010 and 2015. Discourse network analysis combines content analysis with an actor-centred approach, and this is the first
time this method has been used to study party control and (dis)unity. Bundestag debates on the Greek crisis present an
interesting case study, as the issue became increasingly controversial over time, both in the public and the legislature.
While this became evident in declining voting unity and individual-level mobilisation through EoVs, the extent to which
gatekeeping impedes contestation on the plenary floor needs to be assessed. In terms of representation, it is important
that European Union issues not only make it to the plenary agenda but that these debates also reflect the different view-
points of MPs.
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1. Introduction
The German parliament, the Bundestag, has gener-
ally been characterised by high levels of party unity
(Bergmann, Bailer, Ohmura, Saalfeld, & Sieberer, 2016)
and a solid cross-partisan consensus in favour of
European integration (Lees, 2008; Wimmel & Edwards,
2011). During the euro crisis, both these attributes of
German parliamentarism have come under pressure.
The increasing contestation of issues revolving around
the euro crisis, particularly the situation in Greece, man-
ifested itself in (1) declining voting unity, as above-
average levels of voting defection across all parlia-
mentary party groups were witnessed, and (2) height-
ened parliamentary communication in the form of
personal statements known as ‘explanations of vote’
(EoVs). Contrary to general tendencies in the Bundestag
(Bergmann et al., 2016), increasing party disunity was
largely driven by the Christian Democrats (Bhattacharya
& Papageorgiou, 2019; Degner & Leuffen, 2016).
Voting dissent, especially in government parties, gets
media coverage, but the most visible forum and channel
of parliamentary communication is the plenary assembly.
Plenary debates are often broadcast, and they are “one of
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themost important institutional sources fromwhich jour-
nalists obtain information about the most important con-
cerns of citizens” (de Ruiter & Vliegenthart, 2018, p. 656).
Therefore, it is important that EU matters make it to the
agenda of plenary sessions and are publicly debated (e.g.,
Auel & Raunio, 2014), but the analysis should not stop
there. From a discursive perspective, we cannot take it
for granted that these debates also reflect the range of
viewpoints present across and within legislative parties.
In fact, EU politics continue to pose a challenge to
party unity: Matters of European integration and EU
decision-making often cut across historically established
cleavage lines. As party systems have generally been re-
luctant to adapt, mainstream parties tend to be inter-
nally less cohesive on EU issues than other policy issues
(Bakker, Jolly, & Polk, 2012; Hix, 1994; Hooghe, Marks, &
Wilson, 2002; Marks, Hooghe, Nelson, & Edwards, 2006).
This is especially the case for conservative and Christian
Democratic parties with a centrist position on European
integration. While these parties endorse economic inte-
gration on pragmatic grounds, “as defenders of national
culture, language, community, and above all national
sovereignty” (Edwards, 2009, p. 7) they are much more
sceptical towards transnationalism and political integra-
tion (Marks & Wilson, 2000).
We would expect that leaders of less cohesive par-
ties would still try to present a united front in plenary
debates. Proksch and Slapin (2015, p. 9) argue that in
countries like Germany “where the electoral system cre-
ates strong incentives for parties to cultivate and protect
a single party image to present to voters, party leaders
monitor and control their MPs’ access to the floor.” The
extent to which they succeed depends to a significant de-
gree on the (formal and informal) rules of speechmak-
ing, because “party leaders are effective in disciplining
legislators only when institutional arrangements enable
them to do so” (Giannetti & Pedrazzani, 2016, p. 775). In
the Bundestag, parliamentary party groups are allocated
a fixed amount of floor time depending on their size,
and as inmany other legislatures (Giannetti & Pedrazzani,
2016), each group then needs to decide how to distribute
the allocated time among itsmembers. In the Bundestag,
this power lies with the party leaders, and empirical ev-
idence has confirmed that this leads to the exclusion of
critical voices: Themore importance parliamentary party
group leaders attach to a debate, the more they are in-
clined to speak themselves and favour themost loyal col-
leagues who toe the party line over MPs who are ideo-
logically distant from the party leadership (Bhattacharya
& Papageorgiou, 2019; Proksch & Slapin, 2012, 2015).
Restrictive or party-centred rules of speechmaking are
therefore an important instrument in the toolbox that
German party leaders use to maintain unity when cohe-
sion is low (Bailer, 2018).
Although in the German case, party-centred rules
have the effect of excluding backbenchers in salient EU
debates, critical MPs who disagree with their party lead-
ership strongly enough use EoVs as a channel of expres-
sion (Bhattacharya & Papageorgiou, 2019). When a de-
bate has concluded, each MP “may make an oral state-
ment on the final vote lasting notmore than fiveminutes
or submit a short, written statement, which shall be in-
cluded in the minutes of plenary proceedings” (German
Bundestag, 2014, Rule 31, para. 1). The vast majority of
MPs choose to deliver these statements in written form,
and they use them for one of three reasons: (1) to voice
reservations despite voting along the party line, (2) to ex-
plain deviant voting behaviour, or (3) to give statements
that demonstrate party loyalty (Becher & Sieberer, 2008;
Sieberer, 2015). In the absence of direct access to intra-
party preferences, EoVs offer the most meaningful data
source in the German context (Zittel & Nyhuis, 2019).
The primary objective of this study is to demonstrate
why it matters who speaks for the party and to provide
novel empirical insights into parliamentary party unity
and unity of government vs. opposition actors. Unity is
the “observable degree to whichmembers of a group act
in unison” (Sieberer, 2006, p. 151). In line with the recent
scholarship that approaches party unity as a dynamic
andmultidimensional concept (Close&Gherghina, 2019;
Zittel & Nyhuis, 2019), I follow the view of Van Vonno,
Malka, Depauw, Hazan, and Andeweg (2014), according
to which unity is the outcome of the sequential interac-
tion between agreement, loyalty and discipline. In other
words, there are several ways to reach unity, and intra-
party agreement is only one of them. This article offers a
discursive perspective on parliamentary party unity that
is currentlymissing from the literature. It approaches the
under-researched question of the impact of party con-
trol over floor time on discursive party unity and the
government–opposition divide from a new methodolog-
ical angle: In a comparative research design, I employed
discourse network analysis (DNA), which integrates qual-
itative content analysis with quantitative network analy-
sis (Leifeld, 2016, 2017), in order to examine the impact
of party control on parliamentary contestation across
communication channels, actors and debates.
The debates on the Greek crisis provide a suitable
case study, because public opinion was much more scep-
tical than party positions in the Bundestag about grant-
ing financial aid to Greece. We can observe how this con-
troversial issue has been disputed between (government
and opposition) parties and within parties over the time
period of five years. Another interesting aspect about
these debates is that the President of the Bundestag
granted extra time to one or two dissenters from the gov-
ernment parties per debate, for which he was heavily
criticised (Proksch & Slapin, 2015, pp. 33–34). The em-
pirical findings show that the government coalition still
appeared much more united on the plenary floor than
the opposition, whereas the opposite is the case for EoVs.
This suggests that party control of floor time is more im-
portant for government parties. Confirming cleavage the-
ory, the case study of the Christian Democrats reveals
that the party was indeed challenged by considerable in-
ternal disagreement.
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In the next two sections, I discuss the relevance
of plenary debates and introduce the main concepts
such as party unity, party cohesion and party control.
Furthermore, I review the literature on national party
unity with regards to EU politics. Section 4 describes the
original dataset and highlights how DNA and social net-
work statistics are applied in this study to enhance our
understanding of party unity and group coherence in
the parliamentary setting. Section 5 presents the ana-
lytical results, showing how contestation patterns vary
between plenary speeches and EoVs as well as between
parties. In a case study of the Christian Democrats, I ex-
plore the potential of DNA to provide empirical insights
into party dissent. The conclusion summarises the main
methodological contributions of this article.
2. Parliamentary Contestation: The Significance of
Party Control
Communication and contestation in the parliamentary
setting are largely structured by executive–legislative re-
lations and party politics. Debates in the plenary assem-
bly serve two main purposes: (1) to publicly hold the
executive to account (i.e., government-related function)
and (2) to communicate issue interpretations and so-
lutions to the electorate (i.e., citizen-related function).
Since the publication of the seminal report Toward a
More Responsible Two-Party System (American Political
Science Association, 1950), the Responsible Party Model
has been subject to critical reviews, but the basic no-
tion that the electorate must be given a choice between
at least two parties offering different policy proposals
has prevailed. This presumes a certain level of party
unity, because voters need to be aware of differences
in policy preferences and issue emphases, and when
elected, parties need to be able to bring about the policy
changes and problem solutions they advocated (Schmitt
& Thomassen, 1999, pp. 113–116).
However, legislative parties are not unitary actors.
They are heterogeneous, hierarchical organisations with
internal norms and rules. Variance in parliamentary party
unity has been explained by system-level factors, espe-
cially the form of government and the electoral system
(e.g., Carey, 2007; Kailitz, 2010), and party characteris-
tics (e.g., Borz, 2009; Little & Farrell, 2017). More re-
cently, party unity in the parliamentary setting has been
approached as a multidimensional and dynamic concept
(Close & Gherghina, 2019; Zittel & Nyhuis, 2019). Firstly,
we need to make a distinction between (1) party unity
observable in terms of legislative behaviour, (2) intra-
party agreement or preference homogeneity, that is,
party cohesion, (3) party discipline, meaning the internal
rules and norms that make legislators act in certain ways
(Hazan, 2014; Little & Farrell, 2017), and (4) party control,
that is, the extent to which parliamentary party groups
and their leaders, rather than individual MPs themselves
or other legislative actors (e.g., the Speaker, the proce-
dure committee or committee chairs), determine parlia-
mentary proceedings, legislative activity and debating ac-
tivity. What we generally observe is the extent to which
members of a parliamentary party group “act in unison”
(Sieberer, 2006, p. 151), that is, party unity, and the
most common empirical indicator for party unity is vot-
ing unity, measured through roll-call analysis (e.g., Carey,
2007, 2009; Sieberer, 2006). But roll calls by themselves
do not tell as much aboutMPs’ preferences, and thereby
party cohesion. As Carroll and Poole (2014, p. 116) high-
light, “for researchers aiming to obtain ameasure of pref-
erences, roll-call votes are only as useful as the underly-
ing process bywhich they are generated,” because voting
unity is an outcome of the interaction between cohesion
and discipline (Van Vonno et al., 2014), and as we gener-
ally lack direct access to study discipline,we cannot easily
infer cohesion from unity.
A similar point can be made about party unity in
parliamentary debates. It is questionable the extent to
which legislative debates serve a genuine deliberative
function (Bächtiger, 2014), representing the range of
viewpoints present among legislators across and within
legislative parties. Legislative speech has been used to
analyse MPs’ positions (e.g., Lauderdale & Herzog, 2016;
Laver & Benoit, 2002), but we need to take into account
that MPs face strategic incentives to deliver speeches:
Depending on the electoral system and the candidate se-
lection process, MPs may either be inclined to demon-
strate party loyalty or to build an independent profile
ahead of elections (Hazan, 2014). Furthermore, Proksch
and Slapin (2012, p. 522) have highlighted the centrality
of intra-party politics and party control in the organisa-
tion of plenary floor debates, particularly in party-based
systems: “To maintain the party’s brand, party leaders
must monitor their elected members and prevent them
fromundertaking activities that contradict the party’s pri-
mary message.” Accordingly, parliamentary party group
leaders should be reluctant to allocate speaking time,
which is a very scarce resource, to dissenting MPs.
3. Party Unity in the Context of EU Affairs
Beforewedirect our attention to theGermanparliament,
it is important to discuss what we know about the par-
ticular challenges that EU matters pose to party unity at
the domestic level. Issues related to European integra-
tion and immigration gave rise to a transnational cleav-
age, and the euro crisis in conjunction with the migra-
tion crisis was a critical juncture in this development.
Historically, political parties in Europe have been estab-
lished on the basis of the economic left/right division and
the social libertarian/authoritarian divide, and they have
been slow or even unable to adapt to the emergence of
this new conflict dimension. As a result, party systems
have witnessed the rise of challenger parties and dis-
sent within mainstream parties (Edwards, 2009; Hooghe
& Marks, 2017).
According to cleavage theory, conservative parties
with a centrist position on European integration are
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most prone to intra-party tensions because they support
economic integration but are keen to defend national
sovereignty and the nation state against further politi-
cal integration and the sociocultural effects of transna-
tionalism at the same time. Christian Democratic par-
ties tend to fall in this category as well (Edwards, 2009;
Marks & Wilson, 2000). This theoretical argument has
been backed up by recent empirical evidence (Hobolt,
2016; Hooghe &Marks, 2017). National legislators might
thus increasingly find themselves in a position in which
they have to decide between party loyalty, on the one
hand, and constituency interests or their personal convic-
tion, on the other hand. However, contrary to conscience
or value-driven issues (e.g., abortion rights or genetic
modification) that also cause tensions particularly within
Christian Democratic parties (Euchner & Preidel, 2017),
the party whip is rarely lifted with regards to EU politics.
The Bundestag, the lower house of the German
parliament, is a mixed-member legislature, in which
299 MPs are elected from single-member constituen-
cies and the other half via regional party lists. In the-
ory, this presents German legislators with different in-
centive structures based on their mandate and reelec-
tion strategy. In practice, empirical evidence has been
inconclusive as to whether MPs holding a district man-
date are less loyal to the party (Ohmura, 2014; Sieberer,
2010), but with regards to the domestic contention of
the euro crisis, electoral mandate did not seem to have a
significant impact on legislative behaviour (Bhattacharya
& Papageorgiou, 2019; Degner & Leuffen, 2016). But
other individual-level characteristics such as rank, experi-
ence and even gender seem to matter, and the exclusion
of critical backbenchers, newcomers and women MPs
from plenary debates on the future of the Economic and
Monetary Union (Bhattacharya & Papageorgiou, 2019)
carries implications for parliamentary discourses and po-
litical representation.
The debates on the Greek crisis provide an interest-
ing case study, because Germanywas the largest creditor
country (contributing around 27% to the euro crisis mea-
sures) and public opinionwasmuchmore sceptical about
granting Greece financial aid than the party positions in
the Bundestag. Consistently, between 45% and 70% of
citizens rejected the bailout programmes for Greece (see
e.g., Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2010, 2012a, 2012b).
In addition, public opinion polls (Forschungsgruppe
Wahlen, 2011a, 2011b) suggest that in autumn 2011 ev-
ery second citizen viewed the euro crisis as the most im-
portant political issue, but 4 out of 10 citizens either did
not know which party best represented their interests in
managing the crisis (28%) or felt that none of the parties
did (14%).
In the absence of direct measures of intra-party pref-
erences (i.e., party cohesion) and in light of the lack of
scholarship on the inner workings of parliamentary party
groups and the mechanisms through which their leaders
impose discipline on their members and exercise control
of floor time, the aim in this study is to shed new light on
the significance of party control in legislative debate by
drawing on multiple data sources and introducing DNA
as a novel approach.
4. Discourse Network Analysis: A Novel Approach to
Party Control and Unity
Analyses focussing on individual-level determinants of
party unity have produced valuable insights, but they
pay insufficient attention to the interconnectedness of
individual activities and social relations. MPs’ individual
agency is both enabled and constrained by institutional
provisions, party rules and norms (i.e., structure), and
network analysis can provide new empirical insights into
this structure/agency dynamic. Strikingly, network analy-
sis has so far only been applied to analyse co-sponsorship
in the U.S. Senate and Congress (e.g., Bratton & Rouse,
2011; Fowler, 2006). DNA can be used to examine ac-
tor coalitions from a discourse angle, and furthermore,
the method allows us to look at claims through a net-
work perspective in order to identify frames. This study
employs DNA in the parliamentary setting as a novel ap-
proach to discursive unity within groups.
4.1. Data
Between 2010 and 2015, the Bundestag debated and
voted on the Greek crisis five times (see Table 1). The
time period of observation stretches over two legisla-
tive terms. As a result of the 2013 elections, the Free
Democratic Party dropped out of the government and
the Bundestag, and the Social Democrats left the opposi-
tion and joined AngelaMerkel’s Christian Democrats and
their Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, for
a ‘grand coalition’ government. The dataset comprises
454 documents: 74 plenary speeches, 146 EoVs delivered
by individual MPs and 234 joint EoVs. As the primary
focus of this analysis is intra-party networks and agree-
ment, it made most sense to code co-authored EoVs for
each signatory, because if a group of MPs issue an EoV
together, they all agree on the statements, and this in-
formation would be lost otherwise.
I imported the documents into the open-source soft-
ware tool Discourse Network Analyzer (Leifeld, 2019),
and I built the coding frame in an iterative process in
which each document has been hand-coded at least
twice. During the data cleaning stage, I removed all du-
plicates per document and ended up with 9,048 state-
ments. Although not necessary for conducting DNA, in
this original dataset, each individual MP’s speech or EoV
is stored in a separate document. Thus, one document
contains only statements by the same MP, and several
mentions of the same concept do not add any empirical
value. I have coded all claims that express an opinion or
preference with regards to (1) the causes, management
or solution of the euro crisis, (2) the political actors in-
volved, and (3) the wider institutional framework or po-
litical system(s) within which theMPs operate (examples
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of highly contested concepts can be found in Figure 7).
I identified 348 concepts and assigned each one to one
of three categories:
• ‘Policy’ (N = 146) refers to the content of decision
(past, present or future) and measures to solve
problems. This category includes concepts related
to the aid measures for Greece, other crisis mea-
sures adopted by the EU and Eurozone, propos-
als for financial regulation, austerity and fiscal con-
solidation. Themost frequently mentioned ‘policy’
concepts were ‘debt relief for Greece’ (224 men-
tions), the ‘conditionality of aid’ and ‘social fair-
ness of aid’ (each 189 mentions).
• ‘Polity’ (N = 93) is liberally used for references
to structural, formal and institutional features of
the political order and community. To give some
examples, this category entails concepts about
the political and economic order of the EU and
the Economic and Monetary Union, Germany as
a political system and EU member state, and
institutional causes of the crisis. However, the
most frequent claims concern ‘solidarity with
Greece’ (116 mentions) and ‘European solidarity’
(103 mentions).
• ‘Politics’ (N = 109) describes the procedural as-
pects of decision-making. In this category, we
find statements about the EU-level negotiations
and crisis management of different actors, as well
many party-political remarks and (rhetorical) argu-
ments about the existence or lack of alternatives.
Most commonly, MPs discussed the ‘political will
of Greek political actors’ (215 mentions) and ‘cri-
sis management by the Troika’ (129 mentions).
As discussed in the previous section, parliamentary party
group leaders act as the gatekeepers to the plenary floor
in the Bundestag. The more salient the debate, the more
they try to ensure that speakers represent the party line.
MPs who do not get an opportunity to speak but want
to express their viewpoint or justify their voting decision
can use EoVs as a channel of communication, and Table 1
illustrates that a considerable number of them have in-
deed done so.
4.2. Method
DNA was developed by Leifeld (2016, 2017) to com-
bine qualitative text analysis with quantitative social net-
work analysis, that is, a content-oriented method with
an actor-centred approach, in order to examine the in-
teractions and coalition-building activities of political ac-
tors through a discursive lens. So far the method has
been used predominantly to understand and explain pol-
icy change by investigating coalitions between different
kinds of political actor (such as political parties, non-
government organisations, business representatives and
other stakeholders) in public debates on pension pol-
icy (Leifeld, 2013, 2016), climate change (e.g., Fisher,
Waggle, & Leifeld, 2013; Kukkonen et al., 2018) or the
sugar tax (Buckton, Fergie, Leifeld, & Hilton, 2019). Most
commonly, these studies used newspaper articles or
other media content to gather stakeholders’ statements.
A couple of studies (Fisher, Leifeld, & Iwaki, 2013; Fisher,
Waggle, & Leifeld, 2013) used DNA in the legislative con-
text but focussed on the wider debate between parlia-
mentary and non-parliamentary actors. To the best of
my knowledge, this is the first systematic attempt to use
DNA to study unity and coherence of legislative parties
and actors.
I exported the raw data for data preparation, clean-
ing and analysis in Python. In the next step, I generated
the actor congruence and conflict networks following the
DNA manual (Leifeld, 2019). Congruence means that ac-
tors co-support or co-reject a concept, and in conflict
networks, edges are counted when actors mention the
same concept but their agreement, which is a dummy
variable, differs. As I want to know whether two actors
agree or disagree with each other overall, I used the
subtract method (Leifeld, 2019, p. 7) to generate a new
matrix in which “a tie weight between two actors is ex-
pressed as the number of concepts onwhich these actors
have identical opinions minus the number of concepts
on which these actors have diverging opinions” (Buckton
et al., 2019, p. 3). From this matrix we can then generate
subtract networks to visualise ‘net’ congruence (agree-
ment in excess of disagreement) and ‘net’ conflict (dis-
agreement in excess of agreement) in one graph. For the
analysis of legislative debates, this is a useful tool for
Table 1. Overview of the documents in the dataset.
EoVs
Date Debate Speeches Individual Joint/MPs
07.05.2010 First aid programme for Greece 14 35 4/34
27.02.2012 Second aid programme for Greece 13 32 6/49
27.02.2015 Extension of second aid programme for Greece 12 51 9/86
17.07.2015 Government mandate for negotiations with Greece 18 1 6/49
on third aid programme
19.08.2015 Third aid programme for Greece 17 27 3/16
Total 74 146 28/234
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assessing the degree and patterns of contestation. The
potential bias of highly active actors is addressed by ap-
plying average normalisation to all ‘net’-works and addi-
tional network analysis presented below. In order to im-
prove the interpretation and visualisation of (less noisy)
actor coalitions, a threshold value of 2 has been applied
to network graphs and additional network analysis (ex-
cept for modularity). Node sizes and edge widths reflect
the degrees (i.e., number of connected edges) and edge
weights, respectively. I have archived the dataset and
code for public access (Bhattacharya, 2020).
I drew on a variety of social network statistics on
the congruence relation to aid my interpretation of co-
hesion and contestation patterns over time and across
groups. In order to detect communities of discursive sim-
ilarity, I applied the Louvain method (Blondel, Guillaume,
Lambiotte, & Lefebvre, 2008), which measures modular-
ity, meaning the degree to which a network contains sep-
arate clusters. The analysis yields the number of parti-
tions (i.e., communities) that gives the highest modular-
ity score (i.e., closest to 1). To tap into cohesion, I ap-
plied the E-I index (Krackhardt& Stern, 1988),whichmea-
sures the ratio of links with external actors to within-
group links, giving a score between −1 and +1. As co-
hesion is associated with a dominance of internal ties
over external ties, I swapped the plus and minus signs
so that positive values indicate a higher density of in-
ternal connections. Another measure that captures co-
hesion is the Global Clustering Coefficient, which is the
number of closed triplets of nodes over the total number
of triplets. Thus, a high coefficient indicates coherence
between legislators.
5. Inter- and Intra-Party Contention in Bundestag
Debates on the Greek Crisis
The speaking time during plenary debates is allocated
in accordance with the size of the parliamentary party
group and of the government majority, and this is re-
flected in the number of statements made by each party
in speeches. Christian Democratic MPs and the Greens
were particularly active in using EoVs as a communica-
tion tool, while the Social Democrats communicated less
after joining the government (see Appendices 1 and 2 of
the Supplementary File). While more than half of state-
ments are ‘policy’ claims,written explanations tend to be
more ‘policy’-centred and contain fewer statements on
‘politics’ than speeches. It is not surprising that (party)
political contests are more central to plenary debates
than EoVs. Table 2 reveals that the Christian Democrats
and the Left are most concerned about ‘policy’ matters.
The Greens focus least on ‘policy’ issues butmost on ‘pol-
itics.’ The Free Democratic Party is the most active party
with regards to ‘polity’ statements, which the Christian
Democrats are least concerned about.
5.1. Channels of Contestation
Because floor time is the scarcest resource in the
Bundestag and parliamentary party group leaders act
as gatekeepers to the plenary floor, the number of
speeches is low and it is questionable to what extent
they provide an accurate depiction of the range of view-
points and preferences present within legislative parties.
As wewould expect and as illustrated in Figure 1, plenary
speeches on the Greek crisis reflect the government–
opposition divide. Overall, speakers from the govern-
ment parties co-support and co-reject many concepts,
and when the Social Democrats became part of the gov-
ernment (debate 3–5), they became more congruent
with the Christian Democrats and assumed amiddle posi-
tion between the Christian Democrats and the Christian
Social Union, on one side, and the Left and Greens, on
the other side. We rarely see conflict between govern-
ment actors, and when we do, it usually involves those
‘rebels’ (marked with R) that were allocated extra floor
time by the President of the Bundestag. When executive
actors, such as the Chancellor (C), Finance Minister (Fi),
ForeignMinister (Fo) orMinister for Economic Affairs (Ec)
appeared on the floor, they did not attract more dissent
than other majority speakers. The leader of the Bavarian
Christian Social Union (blue L) has often been one of the
more central actors in the government coalition, while
the leader of the Christian Democratic group (grey L)
addressed some of the concerns of more critical back-
benchers within the party in the last two debates and
therefore takes a more peripheral position. The analysis
of modularity (Figure 3) confirms that contestation on
the plenary floor has constantly clustered into two coali-
tions over the five-year period.
Table 2. Statement frequency by party and concept category.
Policy Polity Politics
Party N % N % N % Total
Christian Democrats 1,722 58.0 375 12.6 871 29.3 2,968
Christian Social Union 255 50.9 84 16.8 162 32.3 501
Social Democrats 978 48.9 408 20.4 612 30.6 1,998
Free Democratic Party 175 50.3 84 24.1 89 25.6 348
Left 629 54.9 208 18.2 309 27.0 1,146
Greens 975 46.7 436 20.9 676 32.4 2,087
Total 4,734 52.3 1,595 17.6 2,719 30.1 9,048
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Figure 1. Actor subtract networks for speeches in chronological order (left to right). Notes: Congruence ties are grey and conflict ties are red. Some key actors have been marked.
Figure 2. Actor subtract networks for EoVs in chronological order (left to right). Notes: Congruence ties are grey and conflict ties are red. Some key actors have been marked.
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If we look at contestation patterns in EoVs in
Figure 2, the most striking observations are that (1)
more actors are involved, that (2) although there are
distinct coalitions, they cannot be easily explained by
the government–opposition divide. The findings from
Figure 3 also highlight that EoVs are clustered into three
groups, which became more internally cohesive from
the third debate onwards. The networks indicate rela-
tively high levels of cohesion for the Greens and the Left,
both of which were in opposition during the entire pe-
riod. Both Figure 1 and 2 suggest that the Left Party has
conflictual relations with all parties. Contrary to plenary
speeches, EoVs from the Social Democrats are more con-
gruent with those from the opposition than the govern-
ment parties also after joining the government coalition
in 2013. Those MPs who diverge most from their party
colleagues are often ‘rebels’ (R) who voted against the
party line, future rebels (R*) ormembers of the EUAffairs
Committee (EU).
5.2. Party-Level Dynamics and the
Government–Opposition Divide
In this section, I explore the cohesiveness of government
coalition and opposition parties across different commu-
nication channels further by presenting two relevant net-
work statistics that tell usmore about the unity of groups
identified in the network. First, I use the E-I index, which
captures how many ties a parliamentary party group
or the government/opposition parties have with exter-
nal MPs in relation to internal connections. Second, an-
other indicator of internal unity is the Global Clustering
Coefficient, which measures the density of ties within a
group, in other words, the extent to which members of a
group mention and agree on the same concepts.
Figure 4 illustrates that government parties appeared
much more united on the plenary floor. In fact, the op-
position often displayed more ties with the government
majority than internal ties. But we see a very different
picture for EoVs: Statements by opposition MPs tend to
display higher unity than those from the governmentma-
jority. The only exception is the third debate, in which
almost a quarter of MPs from the Christian Democrats
and the Christian Social Union, but none from the Social
Democrats, issued an EoV. These findings highlight that
for the government coalition it is more important to dis-
play a united front and send a coherent message in ple-
nary debates. Since government parties are not neces-
sarily more cohesive, their leaders need to exercise tight
control over speechmaking.
At the party level (see Figure 5), we find that par-
ties generally have a lot of external links, which indicates
that there is a shared understanding on some issues.
Furthermore, there appears to be a correlation between
the number of actors and the E-I index: Agreement
within a party becomes more visible if their MPs com-
municate more. However, it would also be plausible to
assume that internal dissent rises as well, and the in-
sights from clustering analysis suggest indeed that hav-
ing more internal than external connections does not
automatically constitute party unity. If we compare the
Global Clustering Coefficient across parties, we find that
the Christian Democrats display lower discursive coher-
ence than the Social Democrats and the Greens, even
though the E-I indices did not point to such a pattern. In
the next section, I take a closer look at intra-party contes-
tation among Christian Democrats and Christian Social
Union MPs to gain a better understanding of the multi-
faceted phenomenon of party unity.
5.3. Christian Democrats in Disunity?
The Christian Democrats are not only the largest parlia-
mentary party group but in theory, also the party that is
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most vulnerable to intra-party dissent. Voting unity has
gradually declined over the period of observation. In the
fourth and fifth debates, almost one-third of MPs voted
against the party line. This is very unusual for a govern-
ment party and received a lot of media attention at the
time. Interestingly, Figure 6 shows that intra-party dis-
sent was highest in the second debate, when the num-
ber of dissenters was still relatively small, and the last de-
bate, but as discussed above, this hardly became visible
on the plenary floor, because only one dissenter was al-
lowed to speak (and not by his own party). Elsewhere we
show that not only areMPswho cast a deviant votemuch
more likely to defect in the subsequent vote, but those
MPs who issued an EoV are also more likely to defect,
though less likely to deliver a statement, in the next de-
bate (Bhattacharya & Papageorgiou, 2019, pp. 438–440).
In other words, MPs who have once explained their de-
viant voting behaviour or issued a critical statement de-
spite voting with the party do not keep issuing dissent-
ing statements. Thiswould explainwhy (1) despite declin-
ing voting unity, conflict does not steadily increase in the
party’s parliamentary communication, and why (2) party
rebels (R) belonged to the most central actors especially
in the earlier debates.
A detailed content analysis of the debates is be-
yond the scope of this study, but I have presented
an overview of the concepts that were most disputed
among the Christian Democrats. I have ranked all the
concepts that have beenmentioned at least once in both
a positive and negative way using a score that measures
contestedness:
Sc =
3
􏽭
⃓
⃓
⃓
⃓
⃓
⎷
􏿶1 −
|ac − dc|
ac + dc
􏿹 ×
ac + dc
Dmax(ai + di)
×
× min(ac, dc)min(Dmax (ai) , Dmax (di))
The contestedness score (Sc) is computed by multiply-
ing the normalised scores of the following three factors:
(1) closeness,meaning the balance between positive and
negative mentions, (2) salience, i.e., how often the con-
cept has been mentioned within the debate in relative
terms, and (3) minimum salience ratio, which takes the
smaller frequency (i.e., either agreement or disagree-
ment) of the concept and compares it with the maxi-
mum frequency in the debate. The last factor is included
to give more importance to frequently-mentioned con-
cepts. Cube root transformation has been applied to re-
duce left skewness. ac and dc denote the frequency of
agreement and disagreement with the concept respec-
tively, while Dmax is the maximum frequency for agree-
ment (ai) or disagreement (di) across the dataset. The
range of each factor is between 0 and 1, and therefore
the overall score is also between 0 and 1.
The top five concepts for each debate are presented
in Figure 7. The first observation is that dissent within
the Christian Democrats and the Christian Social Union
occurred predominantly with regards to ‘policy’ and ‘pol-
itics’ claims. Critical backbenchers questioned whether
the aid programmes comply with EU law and would ac-
complish their objectives, and in later debates whether
they have proved to be successful in creating economic
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Figure 7.Most contested concepts in the Christian Democrats/Christian Social Union by debate. Notes: The bar color indi-
cates whether the concept belongs to the ‘policy’ (green), ‘polity’ (blue) or ‘politics’ (orange) category.
growth inGreece.With regards to politics,most disagree-
ment revolved around the question of whether the po-
litical decision-makers in Greece demonstrated enough
political will or not. On the ‘polity’ dimension, there
was no open dissent regarding the EU’s political order.
However, Chancellor AngelaMerkel’s mantra ‘there is no
alternative’ (to the bailout programmes) has consistently
been challenged, and backbenchers began to talk about
Greece potentially leaving the Eurozone, voluntarily or
not, before the Finance Minister publicly discussed the
‘Grexit’ option. For many observers, the Euro Summit on
12–13 July 2015marked a turning point inGermany’s pro-
European commitment and consensus in mainstream
politics. Jürgen Habermas (Oltermann, 2015) said:
When finance minister Schaeuble threatened Greek
exit from the euro…the German government…made
for the first time a manifest claim for German hege-
mony in Europe…and have gambled away in one night
all the political capital that a better Germany had ac-
cumulated in half a century.
This analysis illustrates that this was not merely a single-
handed, tactical move by Schäuble, but can also be inter-
preted as an expression of a wider sentiment in his party
against a ‘transfer union’ and more political integration.
6. Conclusion
The main objective of this study was to demonstrate
why party control of speechmaking is key to understand-
ing the unity of parliamentary party groups and of gov-
ernment vs. opposition parties as observed on the ple-
nary floor. In order to advance the scholarship on party
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 229–242 239
unity as a dynamic and multidimensional phenomenon,
we need to think of underexplored data sources and in-
novative methodological approaches to add a discursive
angle to the literature. This article introduces DNA as
a novel approach to discursive party unity. DNA helps
us to bridge the “gap between content-oriented and
actor-centred approaches to political discourse” (Leifeld
& Haunss, 2010, p. 4) by tapping into the interconnected-
ness of individual speech acts and allowing us to explain
and visualise changes in public discourses through shifts
in actor constellations. So far DNA has been used pre-
dominantly for studying coalition building between po-
litical organisations and stakeholders throughmedia con-
tent analysis, but here I demonstrate that it is well suited
also for the analysis of coherence within political organi-
sations and groups. This study illustrates how DNA, com-
plemented by additional social network measures, can
be used in the parliamentary context to examine inter-
and intra-party contestation and changes in discursive
coherence within groups over time.
In highly salient debates, especially government par-
ties exercise tight control over floor time to convey a uni-
fied message. Government representatives, parliamen-
tary party group leaders and experts on budgetary and
financial affairs have dominated plenary debates on the
Greek crisis in the German Bundestag. This analysis high-
lights how critical backbenchers and EU experts have
challenged discursive party unity through written state-
ments, known as EoVs. While EoVs seem to be a par-
ticularity of the Bundestag, the Portuguese parliament
(Leston-Bandeira, 2009) and the European Parliament,
with some creativity we should be able to find equiva-
lent data sources in other legislatures. Such data sources
could be any type of individual communication found
from MPs’ committee work, press interviews, press re-
leases, personal websites or social media. This would cer-
tainly be aworthwhile endeavour, aswe need to advance
our understanding of the effects of party control and par-
liamentary rules and procedures on political discourse.
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